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JUN LIU
Department of Media, Cognition and Communication,
University of Copenhagen
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Abstract
Digital telecommunication technology has expanded the potential of the mobile
phone to be used increasingly as a weapon against authoritarian rule and
censorship. Since the content of mobile communication is unpredictable and
unregulated, mobile phones have the capability to breach state-sponsored
blockage of information. This in turn helps the Chinese people to maintain
contact with each other, receive information from outside the country, and
make political waves in an aggressive battle for control over information. This
paper examines spontaneous mobilization via mobile phones, with a focus on
two concrete popular protests in rural and urban areas, demonstrating how
Chinese citizens have expanded the political uses of mobile phones in their
struggle for freedom of information flow, social justice, and the rule of law,
while seeking to build an inexpensive counter-public sphere. These processes
destabilize China’s conventional national public sphere by shaping political
identities on an individual level as well as the notion of citizenship within the
evolving counter-public sphere. The political significance of mobile phones in the
context of contemporary China’s political environment can be observed by various
social forces that communicate their struggles with the aid of this technology,
pose challenges in governance, and force the authorities to engage in new kinds of
media practices.
∗ The author is extremely grateful to the anonymous reviewers for their helpful
feedback and to Professor Klaus Bruhn Jensen, University of Copenhagen, for his
insightful comments on this paper. The author also wishes to thank Dr Poul Erik
Nielsen and Associate Professor Jørgen B. Bang, University of Aarhus, for their
invaluable suggestions on an earlier proposal for this paper. A previous version of this
paper was invited to be presented at ‘Media in Transition 6’, MIT Communication
Forum, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, United States, 24–26 April 2009.
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Mobile phone-assisted popular protests in China’s new
media era
Rapid innovations in the development of information and
communication technologies have expanded the potential of the
mobile phone: from being merely a device with which to
share conversation it has become, increasingly, a weapon against
authoritarian rule and censorship around the world.1 The rapid
expansion of the telephony backbone and the increasingly widespread
use of mobile phones have led to a communication revolution in China,
now the biggest mobile phone powerhouse in the world, with over
747 million mobile phone users—an average of almost one phone
for every two people.2 The advent of mobile media has now made it
much more possible for an individual to become an active political
participant. Unpredictable and unregulated mobile communication
enables citizens to breach government censorship; receive information
from the outside world; coordinate a wide range of activities, including
large-scale protests; and create bottom-up, people-based political
movements in an aggressive battle for control over information, while
the publicity-sensitive government makes concerted attempts not only
to register Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards and ID cards but
also to block messages at their source.3
Despite the rapid growth of research on mobile communication as a
tool for breaking censorship and improving the social participation of
the Chinese people, in particular of the ‘Information Have-less’,4 little
1 Nyíri, K. (2005). Mobile Democracy: Essays on Society, Self, and Politics, Passagen
Verlag, Vienna. De Vries, I. (2005). ‘Mobile Telephony: Realising the Dream of
Ideal Communication?’, in Hamill, L. and Lasen, A. (eds), Mobile World: Past, Present,
Future, Springer, London, pp. 42–62. Castells, M. (2009). Communication Power, Oxford
University Press, Oxford.
2 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Gongye he Xinxihua bu (Ministry of
Industry and Information Technology of the People’s Republic of China, MIIT)
(2009). ‘2009 nian Quanguo Dianxinye Tongji Gongbao (2009 National Telecom
Statistical Bulletin)’, <http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n11294132/
n12858447/13011909.html>, [Accessed 6 September 2011].
3 Tai, Z. and Sun, T. (2007). ‘Media Dependencies in a Changing Media
Environment: The Case of the 2003 SARS Epidemic in China’, New Media and
Society, 9:6, pp. 987–1009. Zhongguo Xinwen Zhoukan (China Newsweek) (2007).
‘Duanxin de Liliang (The Power of Mobile Messaging)’, 11 June, pp. 18–24.
AFP (2008). ‘China’s Mobile Network: A Big Brother Surveillance Tool?’,
<http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hymd7FGqkoxuoNDCZdq_QwISBPQw>,
[Accessed 6 September 2011].
4 Cartier, C., Castells M. and Qiu, L. (2005). ‘The Information Have-less:
Inequality, Mobility, and Translocal Networks in Chinese Cities’, Studies in Comparative
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is known about communication via mobile phones and its implication
for political purposes in China.5 Aiming to bridge that gap by looking
specifically at the functions of political mobilization during the 2007
Xiamen anti-Paraxylene6 (hereafter anti-PX) demonstration and the
2008 Weng’an mass incident, this paper examines the role of the
mobile phone in creating a new way of mobilizing popular protest.
These case-studies demonstrate how the mobile phone-mediated
counter-public sphere gives quick and irrepressible responses to
politically sensitive topics, and expresses opinions that run counter
to official announcements, including criticism of the government.
Since mobile phones are increasingly used to mobilize conventional
forms of protest events, this type of activism is considered as a ‘mobile
phone-assisted popular protest’. This paper contributes to contemporary
research on political protests by emphasizing the integration of mobile
communication technologies into discussions of digital democracy and
the public sphere. It applies this approach to an empirical study
of critical mobile phone-assisted popular protests and analyses the
influence of mobile phones on China’s public sphere.
Digital communication, mobile democracy, and the public
sphere
Democracy is enacted through digital communication technology in
many forms. However, democracy is not possible without a functioning
political public sphere that puts the individual in a position that
enables them to make decisions and act autonomously.7 Based upon
the ideal of a ‘deliberative’—as opposed to merely ‘informed’—public,
International Development, 40:2, pp. 9–34. Qiu, L. (2009). Working-Class Network Society:
Communication Technology and the Information Have-Less in Urban China, The MIT Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts.
5 Yu, H. (2004). ‘The Power of Thumbs: The Politics of SMS in Urban China’,
Graduate Journal of Asia-Pacific Studies, 2:2, pp. 30–43. Ma, R. (2008). ‘Spread of SARS
and War-Related Rumors through New Media in China’,CommunicationQuarterly,56:4,
pp. 376–91. Latham, K. (2007). ‘SMS, Communication, and Citizenship in China’s
Information Society’, Critical Asian Studies, 39:2, pp. 295–314.
6 Paraxylene is used in the production of plastics, polyester, and other synthetic
materials.
7 Meyer, T. and Hinchman, L. (2002). Media Democracy: How the Media Colonize
Politics, Polity Press in association with Blackwell, Cambridge. Calhoun, C. (2005).
‘Rethinking the Public Sphere’, <http://www.ssrc.org/calhoun/wp-content/uploads/
2008/08/rethinking_the_public_sphere_05_speech.pdf >, [Accessed 5 March 2012].
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the notion of the public sphere in Jürgen Habermas’ theory is a
‘public’ space between the state and civil society in which citizens
can critically debate issues of common concern. More precisely, as a
crucial player in the public sphere understood in this way, the media’s
role—key in discursive democracy—should be to help citizens gather
to discuss issues of political concern and exchange views on matters of
importance to the common good, to publicize different political views
garnered from the public, to operate as representative vehicles of the
views of the participating citizens, to assist in effective protests, and
to outline various alternative arguments and actions in the decision-
making process for those in marginalized, isolated or ignored groups.8
Therefore, a well-functioning public sphere is dependent not only
on access to pertinent mass media information about the actions of
governmental institutions, but it is also dependent on opportunities
for citizens to engage in rational and critical deliberation that results
in the formation of public opinion and the shaping of governmental
conduct.9
The surge of attention on the impact and implementation
of information and communication technologies on societies and
the public sphere, both in industrial democracies and developing
countries, has triggered predictions about the democratic potential of
digital new media in terms of creating unprecedented opportunities
for public discourse and political participation.10 Many studies note
that in the information age the Internet in China has increasingly
become the prime access point for the public into government
bureaucracies and their services.11 While this may be true of the 44 per
cent of the population with Internet access, what these studies hardly
consider is that the remaining 56 per cent of the population (which
adds up to 652 million rural inhabitants) are yet to be connected
8 Habermas, J. (1989). The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, The MIT
Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, p. 27. Curran, J. and Gurevitch, M. (1991). Mass
Media and Society, Arnold, London, p. 103.
9 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. Negt, O. and Kluge, A.
(1993). Public Sphere and Experience – Toward an Analysis of the Bourgeois and Proletarian
Public Sphere, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
10 Dahlberg, L. (2001). ‘Democracy via Cyberspace’, NewMedia and Society, 3:2, pp.
157–77. Gimmler, A. (2007). ‘Deliberative Democracy, the Public Sphere and the
Internet’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 27:4, pp. 21–39.
11 Zheng, Y. (2008).Technological Empowerment: The Internet, State, and Society in China,
Stanford University Press, Stanford. Yang, G. (2009). The Power of the Internet in China,
Columbia University Press, Columbia.
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to the Internet in the world’s most populous country,12 meaning
that the cyber public sphere, still in its infancy, is currently facing
technological and demographic limitations.13 On the other hand,
commercialization has recently moved the Internet towards a more
diversified and market-driven profile. For instance, Baidu, China’s top
search engine, originally established to give access to all sites, has
been paid to suppress negative news and information about Sanlu’s
contaminated milk powder in their search engine.14 Those who use
this digital searching tool to find accurate information might not be
fully aware that the search engine has become a kind of weapon before
they fall into the trap of those who use the Internet to pursue their
dubious interests. Those who gain Internet access through service
providers are subject to the government’s sophisticated Internet
monitoring and filtering system, which blocks access to websites
containing information considered detrimental or hostile to the
country.15 The art of subtle Internet control as an important part
of ‘new authoritarianism’16 in China today is often underrated. This
practice consists of the Chinese government opening up selected
12 China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC) (2009). ‘ZhongguoHulian-
wangluo Fazhan Tongji Baogao (The [23rd] Statistical Survey Report on the Internet De-
velopment in China)’, <http://www.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2009/1/13/92458.pdf>,
[Accessed 5 March 2012]. Xinhua (2007). ‘Guojia Tongjiju: Zhongguo Nongcun Renkou
zhan Zongrenkou 56% (National Bureau of Statistics: China’s Rural Inhabitants Take up
56 percent of the Total Population)’, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/newscenter/2007–
10/22/content_6921882.htm>, [Accessed 6 September 2011].
13 CNNIC, ‘The [23rd] Statistical Survey Report on the Internet Development
in China’. Bruce Bimber, for example, coins the phrase ‘accelerated pluralism’ to
show that the Internet will facilitate grassroots mobilization and civic organization,
and it will particularly accelerate the process of ‘. . . an intensification of group-
centered, pluralistic politics’. See Bimber, B. (1998). ‘The Internet and Political
Transformation: Populism, Community, and Accelerated Pluralism’, Polity, 31:1,
pp.133–60.
14 Fauna (2008a). ‘Kidney Stone Gate: Fake Baby Milk Powder, Sanlu and
Baidu?’, <http://www.chinasmack.com/stories/kidney-stone-gate-fake-baby-milk-
powder-sanlu-baidu/>, [Accessed 6 September 2011]. Fauna (2008b). ‘Kidney
Stone Gate: Baidu Denies Censoring Search Results’, <http://www.chinasmack.com/
stories/kidney-stone-gate-baidu-denies-censoring-search-results/>, [Accessed 6
September 2011].
15 He, Q. (2008). The Fog of Censorship: Media Control in China, Human Rights in
China, Washington. Weber, I. and Lu, J. (2007). ‘Internet and Self-regulation in
China: The Cultural Logic of Controlled Commodification’, Media, Culture and Society,
29:5, pp. 772–89.
16 Zhang, Q. (2009). ‘“Xin Weiquanzhuyi” zai Zhongguo (“New Authoritarianism”
in China)’, <http://www.cp.org.cn/show.asp?NewsID=446>, [Accessed 6 September
2011].
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opportunities for expanded freedoms relating to issues of social and
economic justice, while keeping successful controls over ‘the public
sphere, including political power and public opinion’.17 The Internet
in mainland China is now subject both to the old ideological tradition
of rule by party and government, with subtle but effective control
modalities, as well as to the new influence of commercialization, which
is a tendency towards ‘refeudalization’.18 Thus, the cyber utopia of
an independent public sphere ‘for citizens to engage in enlightened
debate’19 is limited and this trend cannot be controlled unless an
institutional arrangement is made in the field of cyberspace.
In a historical re-evaluation of the bourgeois public sphere,
Fraser20 argues that rather than opening up the political realm to
everyone, the bourgeois public sphere shifted political power from
‘a repressive mode of domination to a hegemonic one’ ruled by the
majority ideology instead of power. To deal with this hegemonic
domination, she argues that repressed groups form ‘subaltern counter-
publics’ or ‘counter-publics’—the marginalized groups’ own public
spheres—that are ‘parallel discursive arenas where members of
subordinated social groups invent and circulate counter-discourses
to formulate oppositional interpretations of their identities, interests,
and needs’.21 Studies have noted that the mode of mobile phone-
mediated communications utilized by individuals and civil network
groups could shape and facilitate grassroots democracy; bring ordinary
people, opposition parties, and dissent groups into the democratic
participatory processes; challenge those in political power; and cure
the flaws of democratic government.22 Yet little work has been done
17 Lu, J. and Weber, I. (2007). ‘State, Power and Mobile Communication: A Case
Study of China’, New Media and Society, 9:6, p. 927.
18 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere.
19 Hauser, G. (1998). ‘Vernacular Dialogue and the Rhetoricality of Public
Opinion’, Communication Monographs, 65, p. 83.
20 Fraser, N. (1990). ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique
of Actually Existing Democracy’, Social Text, Duke University Press, Duke, p. 67.
21 Fraser, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere’, p. 67. Downey, J. and Fenton, N. (2003).
‘New Media, Counter Publicity and the Public Sphere’, New Media and Society, 5:2,
pp. 185–202.
22 Goldstein, J. (2007). ‘The Role of Digital Networked Technologies in the
Ukrainian Orange Revolution’, Berkman Center Research Publication No. 2007–14,
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1077686>, [Accessed 6 September 2011]. MacKinnon,
R. (2005). ‘Chinese Cell Phone Breaches North Korean Hermit Kingdom’,
YaleGlobal, <http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/chinese-cell-phone-breaches-north-
korean-hermit-kingdom>, [Accessed 5 March 2012]. Rafael, V. (2003). ‘The Cell
Phone and the Crowd: Messianic Politics in the Contemporary Philippines’, Public
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that tackles the issue of the impact or implication of mobile phone-
assisted popular protests—whether it be the nationalistic protests
against Japan or France or the Falun Gong meditation cult23—for ‘the
plebeian counter-public sphere’24 mechanism in contemporary China.
As the current mobile information revolution sweeping across China
has widened ordinary citizens’ access to information and expression,
there has been a new turn in the debates over digital media,
democracy, and the public sphere. Control of mobile phones by the
regime in China is still in its initial phase.25 Acknowledging the
structural conditions for control over wireless telephony is critical
because it alerts us to a series of concrete scenarios in which mobile
phones can be used to strengthen social control for the purpose
of pre-empting risk and guarding against certain ‘manipulators’ to
control public opinion via online communications. As one of the
first of such studies, this paper regards the multi-function mobile
phone to be a good model to illustrate how the new information and
communication technologies and ordinary Chinese people interact.
Further, it attempts to explain the specific context of the socio-techno-
cultural repercussions and information ecologies of China that make
it something of an outlier case against Habermas’ bourgeois public
sphere with regard to Asian countries.26
Methodology
Because of the sensitive nature of popular protests, difficulties always
occur in trying to uncover what is really happening. The first problem
Culture, 15:3, pp. 399–425. Suarez, S. (2006). ‘Mobile Democracy: Text Messages,
Voter Turnout and the 2004 Spanish General Election’, Representation, 42:2, pp. 117–
28.
23 Zhao, Y. (2007). ‘After Mobile Phones, What? Re-embedding the Social
in China’s “Digital Revolution”’, International Journal of Communication, 1:1,
pp. 92–120. Qiu, L. (2006). ‘The Wireless Leash: Mobile Messaging Service
as a Means of Control’, International Journal of Communication, pp. 74–91.
Yeung L. K. (2008). Digital Democracy: How the American and Hong Kong Civil
Societies Use New Media to Change Politics. CNAPS Visiting Fellow Working Paper,
<http://www.brookings.edu/∼/media/Files/rc/papers/2008/04_digital_democracy_
yeung/04_digital_democracy_yeung.pdf>, [Accessed 5 March 2012].
24 Negt and Kluge, Public Sphere and Experience.
25 Lynch, D. (2000). ‘The Nature and Consequences of China’s Unique Pattern of
Telecommunications Development’ in Lee, C. Power, Money, and Media, Northwestern
University Press, Chicago.
26 Calhoun, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere’. Qiu, L. and Thompson, E. (2007).
‘Editorial: Mobile Communication and Asian Modernities’, NewMedia and Society, 9:6,
pp. 895–901.
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is a ‘media censorship barrier’—the difference between what really
happens and what is broadcast. In most cases, popular protest is only
learned about by the public after its exposure in the traditional media.
The second is a ‘sensitivity barrier’—the difference between what
has been found out and which information is available for academia.
No country, including China, is willing to disclose to the public or
academia all the information they hold on popular protests. This paper
uses mixed-method research, combining descriptive and qualitative
approaches with quantitative information from publications and
media reports about popular protests as objects of analysis.27
In order to develop new tools to extract more out of the limited
information available, the multiple-case study28 is applied as one
critical resource to highlight the typical issues in China’s mobile
phone-assisted popular protests. Data for this study draws from cases
involving the spontaneous use of the mobile phone to trigger and
organize protests, and the practice of information distribution within
the context of the civilian spread of mass opinion. This paper is not an
attempt to explain the various factors that caused the popular protest
cases, but instead describes and interprets the extent to which mobile
phones entered into the popular protests under conditions of control.
The first case-study examines the role of mobile phones during the
2007 anti-PX demonstration—one of the biggest middle-class protests
in recent years—against what people perceived as a threat to their
well-being,29 in which the government shelved plans for a chemical
plant after information, ricocheted by mobile phones, indicated the
possible negative effects it might have on people’s health. The second
case is the use of the mobile phone in intensifying the deep-seated
resentment and associated devastating explosion in unexpected mass
incidents in the countryside that manifested in Weng’an just weeks
before China hosted the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing,
and which was also one of the biggest riots in China’s rural areas.
27 Main sources include reports from AP, AFP, Reuters, and Xinhua News Agency;
American-based International Herald Tribune, Washington Post, and The Economist; China
mainland-based China Business Journal, China Youth Daily, Oriental Weekly, and Southern
Metropolitan Daily; Hong Kong-based Phoenix Weekly, South China Morning Post, and Asia
Weekly (YZZK); Fujian-based Xiamen Daily, Xiamen Business News, Xiamen Evening News,
and so on.
28 Yin, R. (2003). Case Study Research, Sage Publications, London.
29 The Economist (2007). ‘Protest in China: Mobilised by Mobile’, 23 June, 383
(8534), pp. 48–49, <http://www.economist.com/node/9367055>, [Accessed 21 April
2012].
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By considering the impact of both events, these case-studies offer a
close look at popular protests and the outcome of public engagement
through mobile media.
Recruiting key people (professors, journalists, university students,
and local residents) as ‘seeds’, this study uses Respondent-Driven
Sampling30 to locate the hard-to-reach groups involved in the
anti-PX demonstrations. Combining the breadth of coverage of
network-based methods with the standard chain-referral sampling
methods, Respondent-Driven Sampling is based on populations with
a personal contact pattern with mobile phones. This method works
to overcome personal bias during interviews, for instance a bias
toward gender, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status or religion, and
provides certain financial incentives for interviewees to recruit each
other for one-to-one interviews. The study sample comprised 87
interviewees, ranging from journalists and students to NGO leaders
and local peasants. Instead of reaching only the most visible, vocal,
and loudest protestors, the greatest benefit of Respondent-Driven
Sampling is that it helps to encourage ordinary people to speak
openly, allowing the researchers to learn about the network patterns
of mobile phone-mobilized demonstration.
Based on peer recruitment, the study was initiated by inviting five to
eight interviewees to help start the project. These interviewees are not
necessarily famous nor high profile, but have a network of relationships
in a community, since Respondent-Driven Sampling depends on a high
contact pattern of the subjects studied. Each of these recruits was in-
terviewed in person in a friendly environment. Following the interview,
each of these ‘seeds’ was given three souvenirs with which to recruit ad-
ditional interviewees. The plan was to pay the initial ‘seeds’30Chinese
yuan (4.4 US dollars) for each additional interviewee. The limit set on
payment incentives was intended to avoid the overrepresentation of
particular groups of interviewees and the exclusion of others. One of
the most important indirect findings was the interviewees’ deep desire
to share their anti-PX stories without compensation.
A mixed method ethnography with semi-structured interviews was
adopted, mainly for a detailed snapshot of how the samples, from
30 Heckathorn, D. (2002). ‘Respondent-Driven Sampling II: Deriving Valid
Population Estimates from Chain-referral Samples of Hidden Populations’, Social
Problems, 49:1, pp. 11–34. Salganik, M. and Heckathorn, D. (2004). ‘Sampling and
Estimation in Hidden Populations Using Respondent-Drive Sampling’, Sociological
Methodology, 34:1, pp. 193–239.
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the middle class to students in metropolitan cities to rural residents,
use wireless services to explore their identities and create new ones.
The interviews took ten days and the answers were recorded. The
interviewees looked back upon and discussed their concerns freely,
including their feelings, attitudes, and understanding with regard to
a wide variety of aspects of the mobile phone and popular protests.
An open-ended interview guide helped to describe and analyse how
they were involved in protests during the politically sensitive event.
The subjects were asked to consider and probe their own behaviours
and responses to the mobilizing calls they received and the impact of
the mobile phone on themselves, their social relationships, and society
during popular protests.
Mobile phones, the anti-PX stroll,31 and policy overthrow
in Xiamen
The Xiamen PX project, estimated to generate an annual revenue
of 80 billion Chinese yuan (10.4 billion US dollars) by producing
800,000 tonnes of paraxylene, was sanctioned by the State Council
in 2004 and underwent an environmental assessment by the State
Environmental Protection Administration, which gave it the go-ahead
in July 2005.32 The campaigns against the Xiamen PX project started
unexpectedly in early 2006 by home owners of The Future Coast,
‘a so-called No.1 health coastal residential community in Xiamen’.33
The letters and emails of complaint from residents about ‘an awful
stench from a nearby wastewater treatment plant and a sour taste
from a big chemical plant’34 to both state and local governments
and environmental watchdogs received no response. Later, Professor
Zhao Yufen from Xiamen University organized a petition in which six
Chinese Academy of Sciences academicians (included Zhao) and 104
other Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference members
31 Chinese people prefer ‘stroll’ as a euphemism for ‘demonstration’. This much
more sensitive and politically loaded term is used to describe their demonstrations
against some unpopular events.
32 ChinaNewsweek, ‘The Power of Mobile Messaging’. The remaining six PX projects
are located in Nanjing, Guangdong, Dalian, Fuzhou, Huizhou, and Qingdao. The
demand for chemicals such as paraxylene is soaring as China’s manufacturing
industries expand.
33 China.org.cn (2008). ‘People vs. Chemical Plant’, <http://www.china.org.cn/
english/environment/239503.htm>, [Accessed 6 September 2011].
34 China.org.cn, ‘People vs. Chemical Plant’.
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enumerated the possible safety consequences and pollution risks of
the 300-acre factory complex, located only seven kilometres away
from the city centre, during the ‘two Congresses’ in March 2007.
They supported calls for the project to be relocated, but accomplished
nothing. The construction of the PX plant was, in fact, accelerated.35
All these ratifications and arguments, little known to the public,36 had
not come to their attention until a popular text message was sent via
mobile phone in mid-March after the ‘two Congresses’. This message,
which spread throughout the country, argued that the PX project
would be detrimental to the environment and public health.37 It read:
The Xianglu Group has invested in the project in the Haicang district. When
this massive toxic chemical product goes into production, that will mean an
atomic bomb has been released over all Xiamen island. The people of Xiamen
will live with leukemia and deformed babies. We want to live and we want
to be healthy! International organizations require these types of projects to
be developed at least 100 kilometers away from cities. Xiamen will be only
16 kilometers away. . .
For the sake of future generations, pass this message on to all your Xiamen
friends!
This version of the text message called upon people to pass on
the information as soon as possible. These kinds of messages spread
to an unprecedented degree not only to the people in Xiamen and
their relatives, but also to those who had once lived or studied in
Xiamen.38 The phrase ‘Did you receive the [PX-related] SMS?’ also
became the opening remark when Xiamen citizens met each other in
the following three months.39 There was a great unease among the
citizens after this information spread. The most common question
35 Huang, H. (2007). ‘BaimingZhengxieWeiyuanNanzuXiamenBaiyiHuagongXiangmu
(More than 100 Political Consultative Conference Members Failed to Stop the Billion
Chemical Factory Complex Project in Xiamen)’, The Oriental Weekly, 26 May.
36 During the interviews, none of the interviewees got the information about
the PX plant from local media as their first source. Also see Buckley, C. (2007).
‘China City Suspends Chemical Plant After Uproar’, <http://www.reuters.com/
article/idUSPEK7567720070530>, [Accessed 6 September 2011].
37 The earliest date that anyone received the mobile message was 11 March 2007.
Interview, residents in Xiamen, 2007.
38 Interview, undergraduate and graduate students in Fuzhou, Guangzhou, and
Shanghai who studied in Xiamen, 2007, 2009. Some of their schoolmates, who still
used the Xiamen mobile phone number, also got those messages at that time, even
though they were studying abroad.
39 Interview, residents in Xiamen, 2007. Also see Zhu, H. (2007). ‘Baiyi Huagong
Xiangmu Yinfa Judu Chuanwen, Xiamen Guoduan Jiaoting Yingdui Gonggong Weiji (Xiamen
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was: since the placement of the chemical plant in Xiamen is vitally
connected to public interests, why was this never disclosed?40 The
2006 documents from the State Council and the State Environmental
Protection Administration41 specified that public consultations must
be held in cases when a project would have an impact on the public’s
environmental interests. Public opposition began to build through the
Internet.42 At the same time, local government started to block rather
than clarify the PX-related information, using conventional censorship
paradigms, including blocking access to news, shutting down the online
forum and the public bulletin board system, jamming sensitive words
from websites,43 and hammering out various schemes to paint the
critical PX-related reports from outsider media as ‘yellow journalism’
intended to spoil Xiamen’s image.44
The press in Xiamen, on the other side, failed to inform local
residents about the controversies and objections raised against the PX
project until 28 May, announcing instead that it was ‘a great project’
approved under the current laws and regulations, in effect trying to
persuade local residents to accept the chemical plant.45 Meanwhile,
the PhoenixWeekly, trying to bring the potentially hazardous PX project
into the public arena, was quickly pulled from shelves in Xiamen by the
Calls an Abrupt Halt to the PX Project to Deal with the Public Crisis)’, Nanfang Zhoumo
(Southern Weekend), 28 May, p. A1.
40 Interviews, residents in Xiamen, 2007.
41 The documents include The State Council of the People’s Republic of China
(2005). ‘Guowuyuan Guanyu Luoshi Kexue Fazhanguan Jiaqiang Huanjing Baohu de Jueding
(Decision on Implementing the Scientific Concept of Development and Stepping
up Environmental Protection by the State Council)’, 3 December, Beijing, and The
Ministry of Environmental Protection of the People’s Republic of China (2006).
‘Huanping Gongzhong Canyu Zanxing Banfa (The Temporary Act of Environmental
Impact Assessment of Public Participating)’, 2 February, Beijing.
42 Interview, student in Xiamen University, 2007.
43 Interview, a webmaster of Baidu Tieba, 2008.
44 Xiamen Net (2007). ‘Bie Haole Shangba Wangle Teng (Never Ever
Forget the Pain Once the Wound is Healed)’, <http://www.xmnn.cn/xwzx/jrjd/
200706/t20070604_223159.htm>, [Accessed 6 September 2011]. The Publicity
Department of Xiamen University published ‘the brief announcement of Zhao
Yufen’, which asserted that Professor Zhao had never been interviewed and had
never authorized any media to express her opinions concerning the PX project. In
contrast, Huang Han, a journalist from OrientalWeekly, argued that the announcement
was intended to negate the interviews with Zhao Yufen by outside news media,
including Oriental Weekly, and frame up the accusation of mendacious reports. See
<http://www.douban.com/group/topic/1676634/>, [Accessed 6 September 2011].
45 Xiamen Shangbao (Xiamen Business News) (2007). ‘Haicang PX Xiangmu yi an Guojia
Fading Chengxu Pizhun zaijian (The Haicang PX Project Have Been Approved by the
National Regulations on Investment and Management)’, 31 May, p. A2.
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authorities.46 That action fanned public anger and provoked heated
protest against the PX plant by residents in Xiamen.
Simultaneously, text messages and calls began ricocheting around
Xiamen, urging residents to join a street protest.47 One read:
For the sake of our future generations, take action! Participate among 10,000
people, June 1 at 8 a.m., opposite the municipal government building! Hands
tie yellow ribbons!48 Pass this message on to all your Xiamen friends!
At the same time residents continued to comment during daily
conversations or through mobile exchanges, voicing their scepticism
and anger. Later, they complained that the local government’s
postponement of the project was not the same as cancelling it, voicing
their great suspicion that it was a delaying tactic that would result in
people forgetting and moving on. The apex of the anti-PX movement
occurred after 28 May with ‘millions of Xiamen residents forwarding
the same text message around mobile phones’49, urging people to join a
street protest opposing the government’s chemical plant. Taking note
of this, the government asked various departments to prepare to work
on stabilizing the masses.50 But on 1 June, around 10,000 people still
took to the streets and staged a peaceful ‘stroll’ from 8 am to 5 pm,
to signal their unhappiness with the government’s decision, which
they feared would ruin their long-term health. This ‘stroll’ pushed the
movement to a higher level of mobilization and drew national and
international publicity.51 Slogans of ‘Stop construction, postponement
is not enough’ became a key demand from the demonstrators.52 By
46 Interviews, residents in Xiamen, 2007.
47 Some reports said this message was definitely first sent on 25 March. See Asia
Sentinel (2007). ‘SMS Texts Energize a Chinese Protest’, <http://www.asiasentinel.
com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=520&Itemid=31>, [Accessed
5 March 2012].
48 A yellow ribbon was the symbol associated with environmental protection in the
anti-PX march.
49 Lanyun, Zhang, Y. (2007). ‘Xiamen Baiwan Shimin Fengchuan Tongyi
Duanxin (Millions of Xiamen Residents Forwarding the Same Text Message
Around Mobile Phones)’, Nanfang Dushibao (Southern Metropolitan Daily),
<http://china.rednet.cn/c/2007/05/29/1214556.htm>, [Accessed 5 March 2012].
50 For instance, local schools told students they would be expelled if they took to
the streets. Interviews, student, journalist, civil servant, and local residents, Xiamen,
2007 and 2008.
51 China Newsweek, ‘The Power of Mobile Messaging’. Asia Sentinel, ‘SMS Texts
Energize a Chinese Protest’.
52 Interview, civil servant who works in the Xiamen municipal government building
and local residents, Xiamen, 2007 and 2008.
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10.30 am, demands against PX were competing for airtime with more
sensitive political demands, particularly for the resignation of the
city’s party secretary.53 As the march went on, many people, including
passersby, pulled out their mobile phones and took pictures and videos.
Some of them sent live updates from their mobiles phone to their
friends, webpages, blogs or video sites.54 In addition, many videos of
the march were uploaded to YouTube.55 During the demonstration,
Bullog, one of the websites with live reports, saw over 40,000 hits in
just four hours.
According to China.org.cn, the authorized government portal site
to China, the local government ‘face[d] strong political pressure
after the June 1 demonstration’.56 The turnabout had occurred.
Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily), the Chinese Communist Party’s official
mouthpiece, ran a front-page editorial condemning local officials
who had disregarded President Hu Jintao’s admonitions to preserve
the environment.57 The local government announced the decision
to halt construction and, six months later, relocated the plant to
Gulei Peninsula, home to a strip of fishing villages far less populous
and developed, in a process that included public participation in the
environmental impact assessment.58
The anti-PX demonstration both resulted from and changed the
dynamics of mobile phone communication and popular protest. It
shows that a new mode of spontaneous and voluntarily self-organized
political participation and mobilizing structures, enabled by low-cost
mobile communication, has diffused into the norms of collective
actions in contentious politics against the inertia and systematic
obstructions in the entrenched bureaucracy in Chinese society.
Mobile phone and mass incident in rural China
Mobile phone-assisted popular protests have not only occurred in
urban areas; they have also intensified escalating clashes, associated
53 Interview, local residents, Xiamen, 2008.
54 See, for example, Kennedy, J. (2007). ‘China: Liveblogging from Ground
Zero’, <http://globalvoicesonline.org/2007/06/01/china-liveblogging-from-ground-
zero/>, [Accessed 6 September 2011].
55 See, for example, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LfzMg0×3KIk>,
[Accessed 5 March 2012].
56 China.org.cn, ‘People vs. Chemical Plant’.
57 Renmin Ribao (People’s Daily) (2007). ‘Dahao Jieneng Jianpai Gongjianzhan (Work
Hard to Tackle Difficult Tasks for Energy Saver and Exhaust Reducer)’, 5 June, p. 1.
58 China.org.cn, ‘People vs. Chemical Plant’.
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rumours, and unexpected mass incidents in the countryside. On
28 June 2008, thousands of mobile phone-mobilized local residents
assaulted and torched a police station and smashed county government
office buildings in southwest China’s Guizhou Province, in unrest
triggered by the allegation of a cover-up of a 16-year-old girl’s ‘unusual
death’.59
Weng’an, a remote county in Guizhou Province, is poor. Per capita
income among farmers—who account for 90 per cent of the county’s
460,000 people—is just 2,000 Chinese yuan (292.6 US dollars) a
year.60 The chaos started in Weng’an County on the afternoon of
28 June when people, dissatisfied with the medical and legal expertise
brought to bear on the death of a local female student, gathered at
the county government and public security bureau. Li Shufen was
found dead in a river on 22 June after being spotted going out with
her classmate Wang Jiao and two other adolescents. Later that day
the police retrieved Li’s body and detained these three suspects. After
a postmortem examination, the local government declared that Li
had committed suicide by leaping into the river. However, the girl’s
relatives refused to accept the results and claimed that she had been
killed. After the police released the three suspects unconditionally the
next day, without any interrogation or taking statements, there were
lots of versions, variations, and recombinations of how Li’s death had
occurred. Some said that Wang Jiao and the two young men who, it was
claimed, had familial ties with the local public security bureau, raped
and killed Li and then tossed her body into the river afterwards. An
alternative rumour was that these three students had taken revenge
because Li had refused to pass tips to them during an examination. Li’s
family therefore presented a petition to the county party committee
office, seeking a thorough re-examination of Li Shufen’s body. When
this was refused, tension began to mount. The rumour spread that
59 Yardley, J. (2008). ‘Chinese Riot Over Handling of Girl’s Killing’, The
New York Times, 30 June, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/30/world/asia/30iht-
30riot.14086300.html?_r=1>, [Accessed 5 March 2012]. Buckley, C. (2008). ‘Girl’s
Death Sparks Rioting in China’, Reuters, 28 June, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/
latestCrisis/idUKPEK27256220080628?sp=true>, [Accessed 6 September 2011].
Mu, X. (2008). ‘Police Station Assaulted, Torched by Local People in Southwest
China County’, Xinhua, 29 June, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008–
06/29/content_8456602.htm>, [Accessed 6 September 2011]. Ding, B. (2008).
‘Weng’an, buan de Xiancheng (Weng’an, An Unpeaceful County City)’, Nanfang Zhoumo
(Southern Weekend), 10 July, p. A1.
60 Luo, C. (2008). ‘Weng’an “6.28” ShijianLiubian (Evolvement of “June28” Incident
in Weng’an)’, Caijing, 7 July, pp. 40–43.
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the relatives had been assaulted by the policemen instead of getting
justice.61 Some text messages read:
Without conducting a full autopsy, the police believed the girl committed
suicide by jumping in a river, and they did not take mandatory measures
against the suspect and ignored the family’s call for a full autopsy.62
This message drew the anger of the public and later sparked
the conflicts that occurred. Li Shufen’s death became intertwined
with corrupt government officials, merciless policemen, and perceived
injustice across the small county. The rumours about the injustices
became bigger and bigger, but these were clearly ignored by the
government. At around 3 pm on 28 June, according to Southern
Weekend,63 two middle school students raised a banner saying ‘Justice
for the People’ and several dozen followers marched behind them on
behalf of Li Shufen. None of these marchers was a relative of the
girl. Mobile phone messages mobilized almost 10,000 people who
went to the public security bureau building where they smashed and
burned all the police vehicles parked there.64 Ming Pao reported that
it seemed ‘the entire population of the county is outside the public
security bureau office building’.65
Different from the Xiamen demonstration, the riot in Weng’an
can be seen as a turning point in the model of collective opposition,
exposing not only a flare-up of intolerable contradictions between
some local governments and residents during the process of the
structural transformation of Chinese society, but also the low public
credibility of official organizations and the mass media. Mobile
networks linking people together became a direct weapon of resistance
to the local government.
61 The Hong Kong media later interviewed the uncle of the deceased girl. His
comments on camera and the follow-up mainland media reports showed, first, that
he had not been beaten to death as had been reported. Secondly, he had been beaten
by unidentified persons. See Guizhou Ribao (Guizhou Daily) (2008). ‘Wo hai mei si (I Am
Not Dead Yet)’, 2 July. Later it was also proven that the three accused were farmers’
children and were therefore not protected by favouritism.
62 Buckley, ‘Girl’s Death Sparks Rioting in China’.
63 Southern Weekend, ‘Weng’an, An Unpeaceful County City’, p. A1.
64 Yu, J. (2008). ‘Shehui Xiefen Shijian Fansi (A Review of Social Incident Just From
Spite)’, Nanfengchuang (South Wind View), 19 July, pp. 20–21.
65 Ming Pao (2008). ‘Thousands of Residents Torched the Police Sta-
tion in Guizhou’, <http://www.duping.net/XHC/show.php?bbs=10&post=860562>,
[Accessed 5 March 2012].
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Findings and discussion
Whether movements similar to those that took place in Xiamen or
Weng’an subside or flare up again remains to be seen, but these
mobile phone-assisted popular protests themselves are of enormous
significance for all those fighting against environmental destruction
or for social justice, as well as for democratic rights and political
participation in China. These protests from the urban middle class
and the rural peasants at the bottom of Chinese society marked not
only the emergence of ground-breaking protest movements, but also
a significant increase in public recognition of the mobile phone as
a legitimate news source and weapon with a powerful capacity to
mobilize. They have had a far-reaching impact on Chinese politics
and society and they are still being quoted, learned from, talked
about, and felt by people as rare victories of public opinion over
local bureaucrats for whom economic development is normally the
top priority (Xiamen), or as a counterattack to official malfeasance,
practices of favouritism, and inaction (Weng’an). Grassroots mobile
phone mobilization in particular brings more chances for the interests
of peasants to take precedence over those of central government.
Transforming digital activism which reduces biases in an uneven
political playing field, enables political insurgents, who are normally
disadvantaged in their access to resources and the main media, to be
in a position to compete more effectively. More importantly, these
events, which rely on public participation, established a new type of
activism that focused on a single issue in order to change government
habits and mass media practice. The power of the mobile phone in
these cases of popular dissent performs the following four tasks.
First, wireless communication technology is poised to breach the
state-mandated information blockade, reshaping people’s views and
knowledge against the silence of local government and media. The
capacity for citizens ‘to communicate with each other’ and ‘to gain
access to [the] information they need’, as Calhoun points out, ‘. . .
are crucial to enabling citizens to make democratic choices’.66 In the
Xiamen protest, the PX issue was picked up by alarmed Xiamen
mobile phone users before it exploded into the ‘real’ public (that is,
the central government or mass media) view. In Xiamen, a city of 1.5
million people, the warning text message was repeated more than one
66 Calhoun, ‘Rethinking the Public Sphere’.
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million times until it had reached practically every citizen there.67
Within hours, the message made its way onto the Internet, while
millions of text messages were circulated even more widely and quickly
via mobile phones as part of the mass campaign against the plant.68
Mobile phones made sure that even citizens without access to the
Internet could be warned about the negative effects of the PX plant.
During the demonstration, when most of the police and soldiers were
just surrounding people, rather than blocking the demonstrators, thus
giving them a kind of indirect support, some of the police were even
telling people to make a racket if they wanted to, and it worked.69 As
one stressed, ‘Every person already knew very well via mobile message
alerts that they, and their children, would suffer if the PX project goes
ahead.’70
Due to a lack of access and intensive control mechanisms, the
Internet cannot be considered as a solution for rural inhabitants in the
poverty-stricken countryside such as the town of Weng’an. In remote
rural areas, mobile phones serve as a gateway to accept and transmit
data between ordinary people against the untrustworthy government
and silent local media. It shows that the right to the free flow of
information—to access the significant information people need—is
as important as the right to express public opinion. Moreover, public
opinion articulated in mobile phone-mediated popular protests is not
merely a virtual venting but a profoundly positive involvement in
public affairs. Communication via mobile media has the potential
to lead to a more open and free public domain that is less constrained
by officially sanctioned agendas, editorial policies in traditional media,
or censorship and subtle but effective controls of the Internet.
Second, the capacity for organization via mobile phones is key to
the success of protest movements, since it circumvents the possibility
of stopping the proliferation of mobilized information. We can also
see from these cases that besides the possibility of the free flow
of information and points of view, mobile phones function in a
sense like neighbourhood salons that help to aggregate individual
67 Southern Metropolitan Daily, ‘Millions of Xiamen Residents Forwarding the Same
Text Message Around Mobile Phones’.
68 Xinhua (2007). ‘Xiamen shizhengfu Xuanbu Huanjian 108 yiyuan Waizi
px Huagong Xiangmu (Xiamen’s government announce the postponement of
1.08-billion-foreign-investment PX project)’: <http://leaders.people.com.cn/GB/
70110/70114/5800578.html>, [Accessed 6 September 2011].
69 Interview, local residents, Xiamen, 2008.
70 Interview, local residents, Xiamen, 2007, 2008.
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preferences into a collective choice. These case-studies demonstrate
that protesters are finding a quick organizational way around controls
from the Internet police and spy software, or any other obstacle,
despite warnings from local government and the public security
bureau. Acting as an extension of individual communication, public
participation in the decision-making process that is facilitated via
mobile phones has, on the one hand, effectively widened the channels
for persuading the government, whether local or central, to gather
public opinion when initiating public policies. On the other hand, it
has encouraged and protected those people in their struggle for their
legitimate rights.
Third, the high-speed decentralization of information dissemination
via mobile phones protects the organizers from being detained or
jailed. In mobile phone-mediated popular protests, every person
has the opportunity to become an organizer when they forward
information to other people. As a result, it has become difficult to
capture the key person in a demonstration. In Xiamen’s anti-PX
demonstration, each interviewee admitted that they had received
one or more messages calling for a ‘stroll’ against the government’s
decision. Many of the text messages came from an anonymous mobile
phone number. At this stage, the Chinese government and their
citizens had been deluged with text protests demanding the relocation
of the project and showing support for the Xiamen struggle. The
efficiency of the information dissemination within the decentralized
architecture of mobile phones also helps to protect the organizers
of popular protests from being co-opted, bought off, detained or
jailed by the government.71 In other words, each person who forwards
the mobilizing information acts to support the organization of the
demonstration, which cannot be controlled or traced back to the source
of the information.
Fourth, calls, photos, and audio and video material from
multi-function mobile phones broadcast information about the
demonstrations to the world, bringing inevitable and irresistible
attention from the central government and overseas media, which
in turn gives power to citizens that they had not even envisioned.
The interactions between ordinary people appear at first glance only
to affirm seemingly positive and effective public communication.
71 Li, L. and O’Brien, K. (2008). ‘Protest Leadership in Rural China’, China
Quarterly, 193, pp. 1–23. Cai, Y. (2008). ‘Local Governments and the Suppression
of Popular Resistance in China’, China Quarterly, 193, pp. 24–42.
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However, discourses, debates, and demonstrations of public opinion
on mobile phones and in cyberspace have been shown to have a
far-reaching impact on the government in connection with its roles,
institutions, and bureaucracies in the information age. What should
not be underestimated in particular is mobile phone-enabled real-
time reporting. With the easy availability of mobile phones—including
mobile phone cameras—in rural and urban areas, people no longer
have to depend on cumbersome and suspicious-looking video cameras
and computers to capture their struggles to send to their friends. In
the case-studies that have been discussed, live reporting by ordinary
citizens with long-lead, on-the-spot reports gave quick responses to the
events, and actively engaged them in spreading politically sensitive
news, expressing different opinions about the event—even criticism
of the government—and forced the authorities to tweak its ham-fisted
responses to challenges from below and its propaganda war. As a
result, sources from the government and journalism are becoming a
smaller part of people’s information mix. The mass media is no longer
the sole gatekeeper to what the public knows. In part, that power is
moving away from those who cover the news to those who make it. And
even with a media blackout on news of the demonstrations, the time,
location, and target turnout of millions of people were spread almost
exclusively by calls, text messages, bulletin board postings, and on
blogs, making these internationally observed mass demonstrations.
Pressure bore down on the local government when live photos and
real-time videos were uploaded onto the Internet or circulated among
mobile users, travelling to larger audiences or groups. Considering
that there had already been ‘citizen’ journalism enabled by mobile
phones, and that the press from overseas media, such as AP, Reuters,
and the Financial Times, had already taken note of the issues, any
crackdown to prevent the protests would probably have made the
situation worse, or perhaps even sparked a violent conflict. The longer
such protests continue, the more politicized they become. In this sense,
the government must gradually begin to take public opinion into
consideration when initiating and implementing public policies. The
government and journalists who work within the control mechanisms
of the government, as a result, need to learn quickly how to help shape
the new regulatory direction, how to help educate government officials
about which rules will work and which will not, based upon the new
era of information distribution.
Beyond the question of individual identity formation, free flow of
information, and organizational capability, the mobile phone as a
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medium in popular protests affords a useful model to understand
how the new digital information and communication technologies are
driving the next social revolution, transforming the ways in which
Chinese mobile citizens meet, work, study, organize, and protest in
China. With a participatory ethos, mobile phones in both rural and
urban popular protests struggle to enable the free flow of information
and expression (Xiamen), social justice, and the rule of law (Weng’an),
seeking to build an inexpensive counter-public sphere which invents
and circulates discourses opposed to those featured in the mainstream,
making the predominant public sphere more inclusive and open to
ordinary people. The practice of the mobile-phone enabled counter-
public sphere therefore centres on both the idea of participatory
democracy and how public opinion becomes political action. This also
means that the central government will have to take the public’s
opinions—mediated by mobile phones—seriously.
Conclusion
Based on the cases of popular protest assisted by the mobile phone
in rural and urban areas—and in a country with the world’s largest
and fastest-growing population of mobile phone users—this paper
highlights a growing problem for the Chinese government.
The development of China’s ‘multi-centric’ telecommunications
network, according to Lynch,72 is shattering a decades-old (even
centuries-old) pattern of local isolation and is establishing conditions
for the development of a cross-hatching ‘social xitong (system)’ which
links individuals, organizations, and groups throughout the country
with each other and with people abroad. Spread via mobile phone, with
a personal approach that incorporates proximity and therefore higher
credibility, directives and rumours from mobile media, even messages
without clear organizational identity, helped to draw thousands of
people together for a public demonstration or mass riot, creating
a cascading effect that inflamed public passions and made waves
in Chinese society. These events, by no means isolated, mean that
participation is not generated by institutions but is based on personal
motivation and articulated via mobile phones. At the same time,
telecommunications fall outside of the mass media-centred model.
72 Lynch, ‘The Nature and Consequences of China’s Unique Pattern of
Telecommunications Development’, p. 182.
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With low-cost mobile phones gaining popularity, there are now new,
competing models of citizen journalism, with more outlets delivering
news. The paradox of professionalizing the new medium in order to
preserve its integrity as an independent citizen platform is the start
of a complex new era in the evolution of the mobile phone-mediated
public sphere.
People want technology that is easy to use and serves a definite
purpose. With farmers accounting for nearly 57 per cent of
the population in China, the issue of the ‘digital divide’ has
become—first and foremost—an obstacle to the goal of participatory
communications and the public sphere. Many critics argue that
development agencies have focused too much on the information
aspect of technology rather than the communication aspect. That
is not to say technology isn’t the answer. Technology may be part of
the answer—but not a very big part—just as the technical features
of mobile phones do not automatically promote democracy and public
service. Other factors, such as education and an understanding that
the new technology will promote democracy, play a big role. As
communication technology—led primarily by the spread of the mobile
phone—seeps deeper into Chinese society, an information technology
sphere is starting to emerge. Details vary from incident to incident,
but they share a common foundation of mobile media as part of
non-mainstream, grassroots efforts to serve the social, cultural, and
political needs of small communities, including the well-educated
middle class and illiterate or semi-literate peasants who have been
excluded from or marginalized in the mass-media public sphere.
With the critiques of the concept of the public sphere oriented
toward a model of multiplicity, the term ‘counter-public sphere’
is more appropriately used for the mobile phone-mediated sphere,
for it signals not only its existence alongside the dominant public
sphere but also its resistance in the face of being excluded from it.
Mobile phone counter-public spheres in Chinese society counteract
this exclusion not only by trying to (re)inject new topics of democratic
expression into the agenda but by challenging the values of public
participation that underlie the discussions of topics already on the
agenda and the norms on which cyber exclusion is based. In the
case of China, mobile phone-assisted popular protests shed light
on and motivate further enquiry into whether the mobile phone-
mediated counter-public sphere could possibly influence the trajectory
of China’s future political socioeconomic development. Using mobile
media as an information source will increase the magnitude of
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social participation in local issues by groups with varying levels of
education. In other words, mobile media will serve as an integrating
force, influencing attitudes towards increased public involvement and
linking new generations to the large social system and outside world.
Over the past six years, the decentralization of media control (brought
on by the growing power and use of mobile media) and the virus-
like communication effects of the mobile phone have broadened
the vision of both the social elites and ordinary people. A unique
democratic paradigm is increasingly characterized by the widespread
application of advanced information and communication technologies
in present-day democratic theory and practice. ‘Strong democracy’, a
new form of participatory politics for a new age, as Barber73 proposes,
requires unmediated self-government by an engaged citizenry and
institutions that involve individuals at both the neighbourhood and the
national level in common decision-making and political judgement,
in common talk, and common action. As we see in these cases, the
idea of the mobile phone-mediated popular protests as a specific
kind of counter-public sphere can enhance, following Barber, ‘direct’
public participation and citizen-powered decision-making processes.74
Mobile democratic practice involves mobile phone users participating
in rational and critical deliberation and consultation, hence uniting
the people to form the resultant force, which becomes no longer a
mere individual or virtual expression online. This in turn revives
heated discussions about the ‘counter-public sphere’ in reality. In
this regard, the democratic potential of mobile phones could foster
democratic revival as they become a more open and deliberative
platform, particularly for peripheral groups, to engage in public
discourse beyond that of the traditional media like newspapers and
television, as well as the Internet.
This paper focuses on the power of communication technology
as an independent citizens’ platform to transmit messages, and
the possibility for China’s subaltern social classes to not just alter
identities, but also to endow the individual with more responsibility
and command over how he or she consumes information, plans
actions, or engages in the government’s public service. Under the
cardinal guidelines of Chinese political correctness, the public—
in particular, the inhabitants of rural areas—are often perceived
73 Barber, B. (1984). Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, University
of California Press, Berkley, p. 261.
74 Barber, Strong Democracy, p. 583.
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as being unlikely to form any independent opinions of political
expression, and thus unlikely to make any significant impact upon
public policies. Thanks to the introduction of the mobile phone, and
consequent rising public opinion and mobile phone-assisted popular
protests, things have already been changing. The role of the mobile
phone in fostering social interconnectivity and making citizens into
independent decision-makers in the construction of Chinese political
subjectivity therefore can be viewed structurally as the diminution
of the effects of the established vertical model75 of ideological
communication and political control through the introduction of
more interpersonal, horizontal possibilities. The political significance
of the mobile phone represents a more serious and effective form of
struggle. It therefore should not be underestimated in the context
of contemporary China’s political environment when various social
forces are communicating their struggles with the aid of this
technology, posing challenges in governance, and forcing the
authorities to engage with new kinds of practices. As the power
of mobilization, democratic expression, and political participation
spreads through multi-function mobile media and networks that
can never be entirely ‘blocked’, the government will have to figure
out how to improve the effective and regular information exchange
and feedback from the top down as well as the bottom up to
raise awareness and understanding among higher decision-making
agencies, the government, and the public. Equally important, the
Chinese people need to think about what kind of useful role they
can play with the help of mobile media.
75 Bimber, ‘The Internet and Political Transformation’, pp. 133–60.
